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Abstract The widespread emergence of innumerable
technologies within health care has complicated the
choices facing caregivers and their patients. The escala-
tion of knowledge and technical innovation has been
accompanied by an erosion of moral and ethical consen-
sus among health providers that is reflected in the aban-
donment of the Hippocratic Oath as the immutable bed-
rock of medical ethics. Ethical conflicts arise when the
values of health professionals collide with the expressed
wishes of patients or the dictates of regulatory bodies and
administrators. Increasing attempts by groups outside of
the medical profession to limit freedom of conscience for
health providers has raised concern and consternation
among some health professionals. The personal and pro-
fessional impact of health professionals surrendering free-
dom of conscience and participating in actions they deem
malevolent or unethical has not been adequately studied
and may not be inconsequential when considering the
recognized impact of other circumstances of coerced
complicity. We argue that the distinction between the
two ways that freedom of conscience is exercised
(avoiding a perceived evil and seeking a perceived good)
provides a rational basis for a principled limitation of this
fundamental freedom.
Keywords Coerced complicity . Freedom of
conscience . Health professionals .Medical
ethics . Perfective freedom . Preservative
freedom . Professionalism
Introduction
The Ontario Human Rights Commission warning that
it expects health professionals to “‘check their person-
al views at the door’ in providing medical care” (On-
tario Human Rights Commission 2008, ¶7 under
“Moral or Religious Beliefs”) reflects a perspective
that seems increasingly popular in ethical and admin-
istrative circles. That perspective is shaped by a vari-
ety of assertions, including claims about human rights
(Ontario Human Rights Commission 2008) or medical
professionalism (Gordon 2004; Charo 2005; Cantor
2009) that are sharply contested (Genuis 2006, 2008;
Murphy 2005, 2009a). The personal impact on front-
line professionals of unduly restricting or suppressing
their freedom of conscience has been insufficiently
considered by ethicists and administrators because
the complex relationship between this fundamental
freedom and the human person has been inadequately
assessed.
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Exercising Freedom of Conscience
While the nature of conscience itself may be disputed
(Lawrence and Curlin 2007), it is generally agreed that
freedom of conscience can be exercised in two different
but complementary ways. One may avoid doing what is
apparently evil or engage in doing what is apparently
good; some decisions involve both elements. This is
notably reflected in health care settings by refusals to
facilitate morally contested services, since conscientious
objection may generate discomfort or conflict, especial-
ly in the context of ongoing technological developments
alongside the increasing ethical diversity among health
care professionals (Fernandez-Lynch 2008, 38). How-
ever, conscientious convictions can also serve as the
motivation for health care workers to provide services,
including abortion (Harris 2012) or medical treatment
for illegal immigrants (Triviño 2012). Finally, though it
is seldom recognized, one can be said to be acting in
accordance with conscience whenever a treatment deci-
sion reflects a conscious effort to minimize harm or
maximize benefits for a patient. This may be
mischaracterized as an exercise of “professional” con-
science (Daar 1993; Faunce, Bolsin, and Chan 2004).
It has been suggested that existing law is unbalanced
because it appears to favor the protection of conscien-
tious objectors and not conscientious providers (Harris
2012). Given the importance of freedom of conscience,
this concern is not prima facie unreasonable. Why
should law not equally protect both conscientious ob-
jectors and conscientious providers? Unfortunately, in
view of vehement denunciations of conscientious objec-
tion in health care (Canning 2002) and repeated efforts
by some activists to suppress it (Murphy 2009b), an
expansion of current legal protection to cover conscien-
tious provision of services is unlikely to be welcome. In
any case, given continuing attempts to limit or suppress
freedom of conscience, we confine our reflections here
to what kind of limits are most consistent with human
freedom and dignity and the best traditions of liberal
democracy. We begin with a closer examination of the
two ways of expressing judgments of conscience.
Perfective and Preservative Freedom of Conscience
A traditional view holds that one who freely chooses a
moral good—say, helping someone in need—perfects
himself/herself to the extent that what is chosen is truly
good and not just apparently so. A moral pluralist might
say that the free choice of a desired good actualizes
personal autonomy and thus contributes to an ultimate
end described as self-fulfillment. The decision to pursue
an apparent good in either case can be called an exercise
of perfective freedom of conscience because it is poten-
tially perfective of the human person.
On the other hand, one who refuses to participate in
wrongdoing—refusing an invitation or pressure to
steal, for example—preserves his/her own integrity,
even though he/she does not achieve the kind of
personal growth that might be possible by doing some
positive good. A moral pluralist might hold that such a
refusal preserves rather than develops personal auton-
omy. Thus, a decision to avoid an apparent evil can be
described as an exercise of preservative freedom of
conscience.
Certainly, the exercise of preservative freedom of con-
science may have a perfective effect. According to a
traditional account, the exercise of moral judgment and
will required by resistance to wrongdoing tends to
strengthen as well as preserve these faculties, which are
understood to be characteristic of the human person.
Once more, a moral pluralist might agree, referencing
positive effects on capacities for autonomous judgment
and action. However, an adequate account of the human
person must include reference to human interdependence
and the centrality of social relationships. Thus, one en-
counters forceful arguments that doing good for others is
more fully perfective of the human person than simply
refusing to do what is wrong.
Limiting Perfective Freedom of Conscience
It is generally agreed that the state may limit the
exercise of freedom of conscience if it is objectively
harmful, or if the limitation serves the common good.
While there is disagreement about how to apply these
principles, they are seen at work when the law refuses
to countenance human sacrifice in religious worship or
when it limits the practice of medicine to qualified
professionals rather than faith healers.
Notice, however, that the limitation imposed is
typically on perfective freedom of conscience; some-
one is prevented from doing some good that he/she
believes ought to be done. Supposing that an injustice
results from this limitation, the person impeded does
not participate in the resulting injustice. It occurs
348 Bioethical Inquiry (2013) 10:347–354
against his will, without any positive action on his/her
part, as a result of the decisions and actions of others.
Nor is a restriction on perfective freedom of conscience
inconsistent with the position that doing good for others is
more perfective of the human person than refusing to do
what is wrong. This does not mean that both species of
freedom of conscience warrant equal protection. Precisely
because others are involved, the judgment about what
constitutes their good may be legitimately contested and
limitations may be imposed on perfective freedom of
conscience to prevent harm to others.
Such limitations may interfere with some of the
aspirations of citizens or their pursuit of moral perfec-
tion but are not necessarily inconsistent with demo-
cratic freedom or human dignity. Certainly, restrictions
may go too far; they might fail to demonstrate suffi-
cient understanding and respect for human freedom
and dignity, even if they do not subvert them entirely.
But no polity could long exist without restrictions of
some sort on human acts, so some limitation of per-
fective freedom of conscience is not unexpected.
Limiting Preservative Freedom of Conscience
If the state can legitimately limit perfective freedom of
conscience by preventing people from doing what they
believe to be good, it does not follow that it is equally
free to suppress preservative freedom of conscience by
forcing them to do what they believe to be wrong. There
is a significant difference between preventing someone
from doing the good that he/she wishes to do and
forcing him/her to do the evil that he/she abhors.
In the first place, preservative freedom of con-
science is more fundamental than perfective freedom
of conscience, because the latter depends upon the
preservation of moral character ensured by the former.
This is reflected in the ethical maxim, “First, do no
harm.” But the difference goes much deeper than this.
Coercion, Culpability, and Responsibility
It is generally thought that someone who is forced to do
evil against his/her will cannot be blamed for the act.
However, while some kinds of coercion have that effect,
not all of them do, and the gravity of the evil enters into
the calculation. Broadly speaking, culpability for more
serious wrongdoing can be diminished or extinguished
only by more oppressive forms of coercion. Further, it
may be held that some things are so gravely wrong that
even the worst forms of coercion cannot extinguish
personal culpability, though it may be significantly di-
minished (Criminal Code of Canada 1985, s 17).
In addition, no act is possible unless a person
chooses to act, and that involves, even if coerced, an
act of the will. Strictly speaking, it remains possible
for him/her not to act if he/she is willing to suffer the
consequences. In that limited sense the act is voluntary
and thus engages the person to some degree. If the
coercion is sufficient to extinguish personal culpabil-
ity, it cannot completely eradicate personal responsi-
bility, nor can it eliminate personal moral awareness
(Todorov 2000, 61, 232).
Accounting for Victim Guilt or Shame
This is not an argument for rigid moralism, inhuman
perfectionism, or tyrannous legalism. It does, however,
explain why a sense of guilt or shame often haunts
people who have been forced to participate in wrongdo-
ing. Jean Améry writes of the “shame of destruction”
experienced by those who succumb to torture (Todorov
2000, 264) and compares the shame of concentration
camp inmates forced to do what they abhor to the guilt
experienced by rape victims.1 Tzvetan Todorov accepts
Améry’s hypothesis that such shame is a product of the
dissociation of the person from the will (Todorov 2000,
263). It is at least as plausible to account for such shame
or self-reproach as a consequence of the inseparability
of the person and the will—and, thus, an inability to
completely separate oneself from acts and omissions
even if they have been coerced.
Reaction of the Person to Complicity
There appears to be something about complicity in
wrongdoing that triggers an instinctive and profound
sense of abhorrence. A sense of uncleanness, taint, or
shame arising from complicity in wrongdoing—even
if it is coerced—is the natural response of the human
1 See also Jean Améry’s (1966) At the Mind’s Limits: Contem-
plations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities, translated
by Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld and published in
Bloomington by Indiana University Press.
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person to something fundamentally opposed to his/her
nature and dignity. It is illustrated by expressions such
as the “poisoned” fruit doctrine, “tainted” evidence,
money that has to be “laundered,” and “dirty” hands
(Lee and Schwarz 2010).
This is not surprising, since even an objectively evil
choice is motivated by a desire for some apparent good.
Should one choose something harmful to oneself—even
death—it is chosen because it is perceived to provide
some good that is proportionately greater than the alter-
native. It would be perverse to choose an evil absent
such motivation, but coerced participation in wrongdo-
ing imposes precisely this kind of perversion upon the
objector: By nature disposed to choose an apparent
good, he/she is made to choose an apparent evil.
It may be argued that, when health providers acqui-
esce in actions they perceive as harmful or wrong,
another entity (patient, proxy, ethics committee, the
state) makes the choice and thus bears the moral respon-
sibility for the act. But this ignores the essential unity of
the human person who experiences moral culpability,
responsibility, and awareness. Equally important, when
some other entity substitutes its will for that of the
objector, it effectively deprives him/her of his/her will,
just as concentration camp guards and survivors were,
according to Todorov, deprived of theirs, albeit in dif-
ferent ways (Todorov 2000, 165–169, 263).
Jekyll and Hyde Revisited
In explaining how normal men could commit the
atrocities characteristic of the Nazi and Soviet camps,
Robert Jay Lifton and Tzvetan Todorov both identify
the same phenomenon. Lifton calls it “doubling”
(1986, 418–429). Todorov describes it as “compart-
mentalization” (2000, 149–157). Both authors empha-
size that “doubling” or “compartmentalization” are
often found in ordinary life and may serve useful
purposes. Lifton, however, identifies a destructive
form of it that he calls “victimizer’s doubling” that
makes it possible for a “human self” to be joined by a
“professional self” willing “to ally itself with a de-
structive project” (Lifton 1986, 464–465).
Lifton (1986) and Todorov (2000) make clear that
doubling/compartmentalization made it possible for
guards and others operating the camps to persist in
atrocities because it effectively protected them from
feelings of guilt. Todorov remarks that, “as a rule, the
legally guilty feel they are innocent while those who are
truly innocent live in guilt” (2000, 263).
Lessons Learned
The juxtaposition of the consequences of doubling/
compartmentalization on victimizers and victims suggests
a lesson that can be drawn from the work of Lifton and
Todorov. When preservative freedom of conscience is
surrendered voluntarily, the consequence is victimizer’s
doubling that enables evildoing and transforms people
into submissive conformists and docile clerks who easily
become the tools of repressive regimes. When it is
suppressed by coercion, the result is the kind of spiritual
rape suffered by those victims of the camps who were
forced to do what they believed to be wrong.
On this point, a word of caution: What is proposed
here is a reflection upon a single aspect of the experi-
ence of some death camp victims; it is not advanced as
a global explanation for “survivor guilt.” Further, the
present reflection is confined to forced participation in
wrongdoing, not to coerced passivity in the face of it,
also a dehumanizing experience productive of guilt
(Wiesel 1985, 39, 54; Levi 2000, 180–181).
The foregoing discussion suggests that the reactions
of shame, guilt, and a sense of contamination that occur
in those forced to be complicit in what they believe is
evil cannot be dismissed as the product of irrational
hypersensitivity or minimized as an ephemeral emotion-
al response. They are symptoms of real harm caused by
a violation of personal integrity that deprives people of
their essential humanity. This explanation is consistent
with the phenomenon of moral injury that some re-
searchers believe they have identified among soldiers
who appear to be suffering forms of impairment related
to personal violations of moral codes they accept (Litz et
al. 2009; Drescher et al. 2011; Maguen and Litz 2011).
Most important in the present context, it indicates that
any proposals to limit freedom of conscience must first
take into account the distinction between its perfective
and preservative forms.
Distinctions and Limits
By its nature, perfective freedom of conscience de-
mands much more of society than preservative free-
dom of conscience. Limiting perfective freedom of
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conscience may prevent people from perfecting them-
selves, fulfilling their personal aspirations, or achiev-
ing some social goals. This may do them some wrong;
that is why democratic regimes have been increasingly
inclined to err on the side of freedom, demanding that
restrictions on freedom of conscience must be demon-
strably necessary, narrowly framed, and strictly con-
strued. But if it does them some wrong, it does not
necessarily do them an injury.
In contrast, to force people to do something they
believe to be wrong is always an assault on their per-
sonal dignity and essential humanity, even if they are
objectively in error; it is always harmful to the individ-
ual, and it always has negative implications for society.
It is a policy fundamentally opposed to civic friendship,
which grounds and sustains political community and
provides the strongest motive for justice (Aristotle
1905; Bradshaw 2009). It is inconsistent with the best
traditions and aspirations of liberal democracy, since it
instills attitudes more suited to totalitarian regimes than
to the demands of responsible freedom.
This does not mean that no limit can ever be placed on
preservative freedom of conscience. It does mean, how-
ever, that even the strict approach taken to limiting other
fundamental rights and freedoms is not sufficiently re-
fined to be safely applied to limit freedom of conscience
in its preservative form. The stakes are far too high. Like
the use of potentially deadly force, if the restriction of
preservative freedom of conscience can be justified at all, it
will only be as a last resort and only in the most excep-
tional circumstances. All of this, of course, is without
prejudice to the question of whether or not legal protection
for perfective freedom of conscience should be further
expanded, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Practical Applications
This discussion differs from the kind of deliberation
associated with ethical decision-making about treat-
ment because it occurs at a level that is usually well
“beneath the radar” in professional environments. In
some respects, it may even be preliminary to metaeth-
ics (Beauchamp and Childress 2013).
The key point is that bioethical discourse about
freedom of conscience in health care is controlled by
foundational premises, assumptions, and blind spots,
so that what is proposed here first intersects with
practice at the level of education, policy-making,
regulation, and law. Hence, the examples offered to
illustrate the implications of what we propose are not
ethical controversies at the bedside but at the regula-
tory level.
Example 1: Tasmania: Access to Terminations Bill
2013
A draft bill in the State of Tasmania requires that a
medical practitioner who objects to abortion for rea-
sons of conscience must refer a woman seeking an
abortion to a colleague willing to provide the proce-
dure (Tasmania Department of Health and Human
Services 2013). Those who fail or refuse to do so will
be subject to a fine of up to AU$65,000 (Gora 2013).
The conflict: Some physicians who object to
abortion are also unwilling to refer for the proce-
dure on the grounds that referral constitutes mor-
ally illicit participation in the act. However, those
supporting the mandatory referral requirement de-
ny that referral involves moral complicity and/or
claim that medical practitioners are ethically
obliged to facilitate access to all legal procedures
that are not medically contraindicated.
Example 2: British Columbia: Access to Drugs
A pharmacy regulatory authority issues a directive that
pharmacists who have moral objections to dispensing
drugs must promptly direct clients to a colleague will-
ing to do so and, in the absence of a willing colleague,
dispense the drugs themselves. The regulator’s ethics
committee suggests that this expectation would hold
even in the case of drugs used for “voluntary or
involuntary suicide” and executions by lethal injection
(College of Pharmacists of British Columbia 2000).
The conflict: For reasons of conscience, some
pharmacists are unwilling to dispense some
drugs that are to be used for what they consider
to be immoral purposes, even if no willing phar-
macists are available to do so. For the same
reasons, others are unwilling even to refer pa-
tients, since they believe that this makes them
morally complicit in a wrongful act. On the other
hand, the ethics committee maintains that phar-
macists must “respect patient autonomy” by dis-
pensing the drugs or by referral and that this is
required by “the ethics of the profession.”
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Example 3: Texas: Provision or Withdrawal
of Life-Supporting Interventions
The provision or withdrawal of life-supporting inter-
ventions, especially near the end of life, can be a
contentious issue. In some cases, patients and families
wish interventions to continue, while physicians be-
lieve they should be withdrawn. In others, patients and
families seek withdrawal of life-supporting interven-
tions, while physicians believe they should continue.
The conflict: Some physicians want to ensure
that they are not compelled to provide or continue
interventions they believe are wrongful; others
want to ensure that they are not forced to wrong-
fully withdraw interventions. Both groups insist
that they should not be compelled to act against
their conscientious convictions, either by provid-
ing interventions or by withholding/withdrawing.
On the other hand, some patient and family advo-
cates demand that physicians should be required
to comply with their wishes and should not “im-
pose their morality” by refusing to do so.
Discussion
In the first two examples, regulators jeopardize or sup-
press the exercise of preservative freedom of con-
science; in the third, preservative freedom of conscience
is threatened.
Applying the arguments advanced in this paper, if a
restriction or suppression of preservative freedom of
conscience can be justified, it can only be justified in
the most exceptional circumstances and as a last resort.
Such justification is lacking in all of the cited cases.
Approaching each case from this perspective fore-
closes coercive measures, if not entirely then at least
until a much later stage in deliberation. Instead, one
begins by asking (a) how the morally contested ser-
vices might be provided without the participation of
objecting health care workers, and (b) to what extent
objecting health care workers might be amenable to
modifying their positions. Thus, the energies and re-
sources of the regulator and those seeking access to
morally contested services will be directed to the im-
mediate provision of services sought by patients and to
respectful engagement with objecting health care
workers.
Resolving and Preventing Conflicts
It is reasonable to believe that problems associated with
access to morally contested services can be resolved
with sufficient imagination and political will, without
prejudice to freedom of conscience. For example:
& Access to abortion is maintained by regulators in
some jurisdictions in a variety of ways without
compromising freedom of conscience: by permit-
ting self-referral, by ready access to a health-link
information line providing details on available ser-
vices, and by widely disseminating contact infor-
mation for those willing to provide or assist with
facilitating the procedure.
& A non-objecting pharmacy employee can screen
incoming prescriptions, directing prescriptions for
morally contested products to those willing to
provide them. The accommodation of objecting
pharmacists can be accomplished in this way with-
out the need for interaction between an objecting
pharmacist and a patient (Chipeur 2001).
& A regulatory authority can maintain and dissemi-
nate a register of facilities or providers willing to
consider accepting patients seeking to continue or
discontinue life-supporting interventions so that
both freedom of conscience and responsiveness
to patient/family requests can be accommodated.
Such as system is already in place in Texas
(Fernandez-Lynch 2008, 146).
The examples and suggestions are intended to high-
light the application of the distinction between perfec-
tive and preservative freedom of conscience. They
should not be understood to preclude other reasonable
measures that can help to prevent and resolve conflicts,
such as advance notification for patients, colleagues,
and employers of a provider’s conscientious objec-
tion(s) with regard to particular issues, when feasible.
Conclusion
The distinction we make between preservative and per-
fective freedom of conscience provides a rational basis
for the principled limitation of this fundamental freedom,
establishing the former as prima facie exempt from
limitation and proposing the “use of deadly force” para-
digm as a potentially suitable standard to be applied in
resolving conflicts involving it. While we have not
352 Bioethical Inquiry (2013) 10:347–354
explored the more complex issues involved with the prin-
cipled limitation of perfective freedom of conscience, what
we have proposed is sufficient to support the conclusion
that willingness to do what one believes to be wrong must
never bemade a condition for participation in public life or
for membership in professional organizations.
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